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Pre-Nozickian Theories of Equality 
Without doubt John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice,2 is the most important work of political 
philosophy for many decades, and at its heart is an egalitarian theory of justice. So one 
would be forgiven for assuming that the discussion of Rawls should be at the centre of 
the development of contemporary theories of equality. Yet, the position is not quite like 
that. Rawls’s theory is, indeed, taken as a fixed point in the debate; a constant source of 
reference and often recruited as a precursor or implicit supporter of a theorist’s own 
views, as well as, by others, a source of error or over-simplification. Yet in terms of 
creating a focal point for discussion of equality it is the work first of Dworkin,3 and then 
increasingly Sen ,4 rather than Rawls, which has created the springboard for the detailed 
work of others. 
Rawls A Theory of Justice is as much a book about how to argue about theories of 
justice as the presentation of a theory in its own terms. Both projects are carried out in 
tandem, and at great length and detail with unmatched insight. Yet the salient features of 
Rawls’ view for the contemporary discussion of equality can be stated rather briefly. First 
there is the question of what, since Cohen has become known as the ‘currency’ of 
egalitarian justice.5 That is, when we are assessing a state of affairs to see whether it 
meets the appropriate standard of justice, we need to know what it is about people we 
should measure. Is it their standard of living; their happiness; their health; their wealth or 
something else again? Rawls’s answer is that government should pay attention to what 
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he calls the ‘social primary goods’; the ‘all-purpose means’ which are valuable whatever 
conception of the good an individual wishes to pursue. For Rawls these are liberty, 
opportunity, the powers and prerogatives of office, the social bases of self-respect, 
income and wealth. Yet the principle most relevant for issues of distributive justice, and 
hence the topic of equality, the ‘difference principle’ is a principle for the distribution only 
of wealth and income. The difference principle states that a just society is one which 
makes the worst off as well off as possible; i.e. that it maximizes the wealth and income 
of the least advantaged. It’s form – that it allows inequalities if they are in the interests of 
the worst off – and its content – that it distributes income and wealth – are both highly 
significant. 
To understand the current debate, however, we have to take a step further back than 
Rawls, to Bernard Williams’ paper ‘The Idea of Equality’.6 This is a deep and subtle 
paper which explores many tensions and nuances within the idea of equality, and, 
indeed, develops themes that are constantly being re-discovered or re-invented. Yet its 
initial importance for the current debate relies on a couple of sentences which provoked 
a strong reaction from Robert Nozick. Williams sees distribution according to need as a 
key plank in the theory of equality and writes ‘The proper ground of the distribution of 
health care is health need. This is a necessary truth.’7 This may seem beyond criticism, 
yet Nozick replies, that if this is a necessary truth then, it seems, by parity of reasoning 
so should the following ‘The proper ground of the distribution of barbering care is 
barbering need.’8 
Of course Nozick wants us to agree that this is not even a truth, never mind a necessary 
truth. And if that is right, then Williams example of health care does not express a 
necessary truth either. In the case of hair care we feel that providers of the services 
should have an important say in who gets to use them. Nozick’s point is that the same 
ought to be true of health care providers. Why should they be forced to respond to need, 
rather than the highest bidder, or some other criteria? 
Nozick’s argument against Williams was one part – perhaps even a small part - of the 
general assault on egalitarian ideas which took place in Anarchy, State, and Utopia. Yet 
it is highly significant. Nozick presents Williams’ argument as the best argument for 
equality he has seen – challenging the reader to tell him of a better one – and is 
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apparently refuted in a sentence. This suggests that equality those who have defended 
equality have done so without good arguments, and immediately puts egalitarians on the 
defensive. Second, Nozick makes an excellent point that egalitarians have tended to 
consider individuals as consumers, rather than producers. As Nozick puts it, egalitarians 
tend to reason as if all of a society’s resources exist in a ‘big social pot’ and all that 
matters is how the contents of this pot are distributed. Yet much, if not all, of this pot 
consists of goods that are made, or at least transformed, by human endeavour, or of 
services composed of the actions of others. This point has fallen out of sight of 
egalitarian thinking. Yet how can one even discuss the distribution of goods without 
considering their production, and such things as the motivations and rights of those who 
do produce these goods? 
Now, whether or not this appears to be a fair critique of Williams, many will think it a 
grossly unfair criticism against Rawls. Rawls does not argue for flat equality, but for the 
difference principle, which will tolerate inequalities as long as they are in the interests of 
the worst off. The whole point of this is to allow incentives to make individuals more 
productive, for the benefit of all. Hence Rawls does not ignore the motivations of 
producers. However, this is only a half answer. Rawls is clear that he does not believe 
that the more productive have claims of natural right or desert over their production. 
Laws and institutions are to be set up so that they are to the greatest benefit to the least 
advantaged; those who have the least income and wealth. Yet, some may think, this 
remains a very one-sided view. Why should it be that all that ultimately matters is the 
wealth and income of the least advantaged? 
 
Dworkin and Equality of Resources 
The difficulty for Rawls in this area was brought out very well indeed by Ronald Dworkin, 
who, in a pair of long papers at the same time, set out a response to Nozick’s libertarian 
challenges, as well as attempting to refute a range of competing egalitarian theories.9  
Dworkin can be read as raising two central challenges to Rawls.10 The first develops 
Nozick’s objections, and can be put like this: before devoting social resources to 
improving the position of those with the least income and wealth, should we not, at the 
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very least, first investigate how they came to be in that position? Some may be badly off 
because they are unable to work, or unable to find work. But others may have chosen to 
do no work. Are they equally deserving or entitled to benefit from the work of others? 
Can it be fair to tax the hard-working for the benefit of those who are equally capable of 
hard work, and equally talented, but choose to laze around instead? The difference 
principle, however, does not require answers to these questions. Hence, to put 
Dworkin’s first argument in a nutshell, it subsidizes scroungers, or to put it less 
tendentiously, the deliberately under-productive. In Dworkin’s view this is contrary to 
equality. Equality should, other things being equal, allow those who work hard to reap 
the rewards, while those who chose to do less should bear the consequences of their 
choices.  
A second objection raises a new difficulty. The index of primary goods, and in particular 
the focus on income and wealth, ignores the fact that some people have much more 
expensive needs than others. In particular, people who are severely disabled, or have 
expensive medical requirements, may have a reasonable income, but this could be 
wholly inadequate to pay the expenses needed to achieve a reasonable level of well-
being. 
The natural response to the problem of expensive needs, such as those of disabled 
people, would be to abandon primary goods as a currency of justice, and move to 
assessment of well-being in terms of some form of welfare, such as happiness or 
preference satisfaction. However, Dworkin argues that this would be a mistake. First he 
unleashes a battery of objections against the coherence of a welfare measure – 
essentially the difficulty of determining when two different people are at the same level, 
which of course is central to any theory of equality. But the argument that is most 
distinctive and has had the greatest impact, is the problem of expensive tastes. Imagine 
two people who have the same ordinary tastes, talents and resources, and the same 
ability to convert resources into welfare, however that is construed. Now one of them – 
Louis – decides that he wants to change his tastes, and manages to develop a taste for 
pre-phylloxera claret and plovers’ eggs, and is consequently unsatisfied with beer and 
hens’ eggs. According to Dworkin, the theory of equality of welfare would require a 
transfer of resources from the person with ordinary tastes to the person with expensive 
tastes, in order to equalise their resources. This, he plausibly argues, is deeply counter-
intuitive. 
The difficulties he identifies in Rawls’s theory are addressed by Dworkin in a way which 
avoids the problem of subsidizing expensive tastes. The key insight is that a notion of 
responsibility can be incorporated within the theory of equality. It is possible to make 
people responsible for matters within some domains, but not within others. Dworkin 
makes a distinctive between one’s ambitions –including the realm of the voluntary 
choices one makes – and endowments, which we can think of as including in-born 
talents, genetic pre-dispositions, and so on. In brief, Dworkin’s theory is that while 
equality requires government to take steps to compensate for the bad ‘brute luck’ of 
being born with poor endowments, or unforeseeable poor luck in other aspects of life, it 
does not require compensation for poor ‘option luck’ which typically includes the results 
of freely made choices. Hence on Dworkin’s view there is no reason to subsidise Louis, 
who has made his own choice to develop expensive tastes. Similarly those who choose 
not to work, if they are able to, will not be subsidised either, and this, in principle, 
overcomes the ‘problem of responsibility’ identified with Rawls’ Difference Principle. 
This, however, leaves us with the question of how to determine the appropriate level of 
compensation or subsidy. Here Dworkin makes the brilliant move of appealing to the 
idea first of insurance, and then of hypothetical insurance. His first observation is that 
real life insurance converts brute luck into option luck. It may be a matter of pure chance 
whether lightning strikes my house. But it is not a matter of pure chance if I have 
declined to take out an easily available insurance policy to protect myself from loss. 
Dworkin’s argument is that if insurance is available against a hazard, and I decide not to 
take out insurance, then, against a background of equality, there is no case in justice for 
subsidising the uninsured by taxing others who beforehand were no better off. If it were 
possible to insure against all brute luck then it appears that Dworkin’s theory would 
simply require an equal distribution of resources and then allow people to make their 
own choices and run whichever risks they wished. 
Life, though, is not so simple. Brute lucks affects us from the moment we are born. Some 
people are born with low talents, or, as already discussed, disabled: this was one of the 
problems Dworkin identifies for Rawls. But it is not possible to take out insurance against 
bad brute luck which has already happened. However, it is possible to imagine what 
insurance one would take out, hypothetically, behind a veil of ignorance in which you 
knew the preponderance of, and disadvantage caused by, different types of disability, 
but did not know whether or not you personally were affected. Knowing this information 
should allow one to decide whether to insure, and if so at what level. Averaging the 
decisions gives a standard hypothetical premium and payout, and these can be used to 
model a just tax and transfer scheme. A similar move is available to model appropriate 
welfare payments for those of low talent.  
Dworkin’s argument, then, has the merit of squaring up to, and attempting to answer, a 
number of hard questions. What is the currency of justice? How do we make room for 
issues of responsibility within egalitarian theory? How do we determine the appropriate 
level of compensation for people of low earning power or who have disabilities? A 
coherent systematic picture emerges which provides a response to Nozick, and repairs 




Before looking at direct responses to Dworkin, it is worth noting that not everyone 
accepts that the problem of responsibility is as serious as he supposes. An alternative 
theory suggests that each person is entitled to a payment from the state whether or not 
they work, or are willing to work or not. This is the theory of ‘unconditional basic income’, 
and it has several possible foundations. Philippe van Parijs11 and Andrew Levine,12 have 
defended the view essentially on the grounds of neutrality between conceptions of the 
good; some prefer to work, some prefer not to, and, to simplify, why should we privilege 
the conception of the good of one over the other? Arguments are also made that it would 
have various consequential advantages such as ending discrimination against part-time 
workers, and requiring work with poor conditions to be paid a decent wage.13 
In an alternative version defended by Hillel Steiner, all human beings are joint owners of 
the earth and its resources. To simplify, we can imagine each of us as the owner of one 
share in ‘Earth PLC’. Anyone who wishes to use any of the world’s resources must pay a 
rent to do so, and this rent is returned to the shareholders as a dividend. Accordingly 
anyone who uses more than a per capita share of the world’s resources owes more rent 
than he or she will get back in dividend; those who use less will get more dividend than 
they must pay in rent. This, of course, yields a payment for everyone, whether they act 
responsibly or irresponsibly, although, of course, some will pay more in rent than they 
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receive back in dividend.14 While I will not here pursue this option further, it is necessary 
to register it as a live and important line in political philosophy. 
 
Equality of Welfare Revisited 
To return to the main line, recall that Dworkin considers and rejects equality of welfare as 
a possible response to the problem presented by the fact that disabled people may need 
more resources than other people to achieve an acceptable standard of living. The 
rejection is based on the argument from Louis’s expensive tastes. Richard Arneson, 
however, suggests that this argument is confused.15 The problem with Louis is that he is 
has deliberately cultivated expensive tastes. He could have achieved the same level of 
welfare as other people by remaining content with hen’s eggs and beer, but for whatever 
reason he decided to cultivate expensive tastes. Arneson’s response is that we need to 
understand that there is a distinction not only between theories of resources and 
theories of welfare, but also what we could call ‘outcome’ and ‘opportunity’ theories. It is 
true, Arneson, accepts, that equality of welfare outcomes would require subsidizing 
Louis’s deliberately cultivated expenses tastes. However, Louis does have equality of 
opportunity for welfare, but he squanders this by deliberately cultivating expensive 
tastes. If he was born with expensive tastes then the case for subsidising is more 
compelling, for he would then lack equality of opportunity for welfare. Hence, Arneson 
argues, Dworkin has drawn the wrong conclusion from his example. In effect, Arneson 
suggests, Dworkin has compared equality of welfare outcomes with equality of 
opportunity for resources. The expensive tastes argument shows that equality of welfare 
outcomes is unacceptable, but this is a reason for moving to an opportunity conception,  
not a resources conception. 
G.A. Cohen argues in a similar way, although unlike Arneson he claims that an adequate 
theory of equality must use the currency of ‘advantage’ which incorporates both welfare 
and resources, although Cohen admits that he has no account of how the two notions 
can be combined.16 Cohen endorses one of Dworkin’s arguments against pure 
welfarism; that it would have the bizarre consequence that it would require transfers from 
the very cheerful poor – such as Dickens’ Tiny Tim – to the wealthy but miserable, such 
as Scrooge. But equally, Cohen argues, it would be wrong to follow Dworkin and 
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endorse a pure resource based metric in which people were not compensated for pain 
and suffering, for example. 
Dworkin, however, is not persuaded by the criticisms of Arneson and Cohen, arguing 
that the objection to subsidizing expensive tastes is equally strong even if they are the 
result of genetic pre-disposition. Whether a person should be subsidised for their 
expensive tastes depends on whether the average person would, hypothetically, have 
insured against having that taste. The origin of the taste is, for Dworkin, not relevant. 
Critics are far from convinced that this is plausible response, and I think it is fair to say 
that the dispute especially between Dworkin and Cohen remains unsettled.17  
 
Equality, Priority and Sufficiency 
A different line of criticism of the theory of equality focuses on the question of whether 
equality is of value in itself. A traditional argument against equality is that it requires 
levelling down: that if there is a choice between equality at a lower level and inequality at 
a higher level, then the theory demands equality, even if it makes literally every 
individual worse off. Although familiar, few egalitarians took this argument seriously, 
brushing it aside one way or another, until Rawls presented the difference principle, in 
which inequalities are tolerated when they are to the advantage of the worst off. This 
prevents levelling down, of course, which is its aim. 
It was, however, unclear whether Rawls’ theory should be treated as one of equality or 
not. On the one hand, theorists such as Nagel treated Rawls as a paradigm example of 
a theorist of equality,18 and critics of equality take Rawls as their target. On the other 
hand it cannot be denied that Rawls’ theory permits inequality, and so some more radical 
theorists criticised Rawls as a theorist of inequality.19  The situation, however, has been 
clarified by two papers, by Harry Frankfurt20 and Derek Parfit,21 which generate 
distinctions between a range of theories of different strength and commitment. First, 
Frankfurt argues that egalitarians are not, or at least should not, be concerned with 
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equality as such, but with whether individuals are leading sufficiently good lives, where 
this is to be understood non-comparatively. What matters, argues Frankfurt, is whether 
people have enough to flourish. Comparisons with others are alienating, and deflect 
oneself from the value of one’s own life. Whatever we think of this further point, it cannot 
be denied that there is a certain attraction to such a ‘sufficiency’ view, as distinct from 
equality. 
However, there are further options. Parfit describes a Rawlsian-style view as one of 
‘priority to the worst off’, which again is distinct from equality. Indeed this view comes in 
various strengths. Rawls’ own view is one of absolute priority, where the claims of the 
worst off must always be given priority. Parfit’s view is one of a form of ‘weighted priority’ 
in which the claims of the worst off have greater weight than then claims of others, but 
can, at least in theory, be outweighed. On this view there is such a thing as ‘asking too 
much’ even if you are the worst off in society.  
The contributions of Frankfurt and Parfit have been immensely valuable, allowing 
theorists better to understand their own intuitions and theoretical commitments. For 
example, Arneson has moved from an equality view to one of weighted priority.22 We will 
see further applications of these distinctions shortly. 
 
Sen and Capability Theory 
In parallel to Dworkin, Amartya Sen was also developing an egalitarian response to 
Rawls. Sen was particularly exercised by Rawls’s index of well-being in terms of primary 
goods, and by the fact that this ignored the plight of disabled people. Sen’s suggestion is 
that evaluation of how well an individual’s life is going, from the point of view of whether 
they should be offered state support, should measure neither the resources someone 
has, or the welfare they are able to derive, but their ‘capability to function’. A functioning 
is what a person can ‘do or be’: achieve nourishment, health, a decent life span, self-
respect, and so on. A person’s ‘capability set’ is the alternative sets of functionings they 
are able to achieve with their resources and opportunities, and a capability, therefore is 
the freedom to achieve a functioning.23 
This pluralist view of well-being is often regarded as a more realistic account that any 
theory of welfare or resources. Although Sen’s theory is not set out to respond to 
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Nozick’s objections one can see, nevertheless, that it contains within it a particular 
theory of responsibility. If one has the capability to achieve functionings, but neglects to 
do so, then one is responsible for one’s own situation and does not have a claim in 
justice against others for help. This notion of freedom and responsibility, within a theory 
of equality, has made the theory attractive to many. 
Sen’s theory has become extremely important in development economics, influencing 
policy within organisations such as United Nations, encouraging a move away from 
income measures of poverty, to ‘lack of basic functioning’.24 This has been among the 
contributions which won him the Nobel Prize in Economics in 1998. However, political 
philosophy has found it harder to incorporate Sen’s theory, for two main reasons. First, 
Sen has always refrained from setting out a definitive list of human functionings. Second, 
on a pluralist view it is very hard to understand what equality means. Equality seems to 
require a way of measuring functionings against each other, but the essence of a 
pluralist view is that this is not, in general, possible. Solving the first problem, as Martha 
Nussbaum has attempted to do in laying out an account of essential human 
functionings,25 simply brings out the difficulty of the second. 
Nevertheless, the contributions of  Frankfurt and Parfit have allowed political 
philosophers to make better use of Sen’s approach, in that a ‘sufficiency view’ of 
capabilities has appeared a more promising approach (Anderson, 1999, Nussbaum, 
2006) in which the goal of social policy is to bring each person to a threshold level of 
sufficiency in each capability.26 There are, however, severe difficulties when resource 
constraints make this impossible.27 The theory will need to be supplemented in some 
way to deal with priority setting between competing claims, and many of the initial 
difficulties reassert themselves. However, the position may not be completely hopeless, 
and it has been argued that it is possible to combine a prioritarian position with a 
(modified) capability view.28 
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 Relational Equality and The Critique of Luck Egalitarianism 
Alongside the revival of Sen’s approach, we have also seen a set of criticisms levelled 
against the way in which responsibility is incorporated into the theories of Dworkin, 
Cohen and Arneson. Together, in a phrase coined by Anderson, those theories are 
collectively referred to as ‘luck egalitarianism’ as their goal is to ‘neutralise’ the effects of 
luck on individual lives.29 
Pursuit of this goal, however, appears to have a number of unfortunate effects. For 
example, it will have to split claimants into those who are responsible for their plight and 
those who are not, which in some circumstances can be humiliating even for those who 
are entitled to help, who, for example, might have to argue that they are untalented in 
order to qualify for state support.30 Furthermore, many of the policies strictly entailed by 
the theory seem deeply inhumane, for example, discriminating between the disabled. 
Those who are responsible for their own disability, on the luck egalitarian view, should 
not be entitled to any state help. Anderson suggests that the ‘negative aim’ of 
egalitarianism should not be to eliminate the effects of bad luck, but to end oppression, 
domination and exploitation. An equal society is not one which has eliminated the effects 
of luck, but that has achieved relations of equality between individuals. Such a view has 
also been defended in recent writing by Samuel Scheffler..31  
This move towards ‘relational’ or ‘social’ equality picks up a concern running from a older 
tradition in thinking of equality, exemplified in the works of such thinkers as R.H. 
Tawney,32 and carried forward by David Miller,33 Michael Walzer,34 and Richard 
Norman.35. Indeed, this theme is prominent in Bernard Williams’ paper, which, we saw 
above, received such savage, and perhaps distracting, criticism from Nozick.36 The 
central idea is that a society of equals has to create conditions of mutual respect, and 
self-respect and thereby overcome hierarchical divisions. This type of view has strong 
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affinities with the work of the ‘difference’ theorist Iris Marion Young,37 and ‘recognition’ 
theorist Nancy Fraser.38 There are numerous variation on this theme, but the basic idea 
is an equal society is one that has the right quality of relations between individuals, 
rather than one which distributes the ‘currency’ of justice, the right way. 
Even though there appears to be increasing sympathy for the idea that social equality is 
an indispensable part of an equal society, it is also noted that distributive elements 
cannot be ignored either.39 One major current research programme is to try to work out 




Although there is rather little published on these themes so far, there is increasing 
attention, evidenced through conferences on the topics, in two related topics. One starts 
from the observation that much recent work in political philosophy is based on ‘ideal 
theory’ or ‘full compliance’. That is, its aim is to set out a theory for the just society, 
assuming that all citizens will follow the rules. However, there is a lurking question about 
the application of such theories to the real world. It may be impossible to implement a 
theory for many reasons; that it makes unreasonable demands of human beings; that it 
is not fully coherent; that there is no political will; that there is no route from where we 
are to where we would be, and so on. For this reason some theorists are beginning to 
think that greater attention to issues of ‘non-ideal’ theory and ‘the real world’ is needed, 
following the thought that political philosophy must start from where we are. 
This programme is really seamless with another: social justice in practice, which tries to 
use philosophical theory to consider real social policy issues, and, in turn, modify the 
theory in the light of such issues. If, for example, a theory of equality suggests ways of 
dealing with inequality which conflict with existing progressive and enlightened social 
policies, it seems that, at the least, we should consider whether we have the right theory, 
and be prepared to revise the theory so that it can not only fit in with the best social 
policies, but also help determine priorities in hard cases.40  
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 Conclusion 
Equality is a vibrant area of interest. Much of the work conducted over the last two 
decades has been in response to an agenda set by Robert Nozick’s powerful criticisms 
of equality, and especially on the claimed neglect of issues of personal responsibility 
within egalitarian theory. However, in attempting to respond to Nozick it is arguable that 
these concerns have distorted the theory, paying too much attention to issues of 
individual responsibility, choice and fairness, and neglecting the traditional egalitarian 
concerns of respect for individuality social division, oppression and domination, and, 
indeed, how to bring about improvements to the world we actually live in. There remains 
a great deal to be done. 
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